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Evaluation Report 'Ncr. 53 (L) 
20 July 1945 
poMBINED INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES SUD-COMMITTEE 
INTERROGATION OF ALBERT SPEER AND MEMBERS OF THE 
FORMER REICH MINISTRY OF ARMAMENTS AND WAR PRODUCTION 
(Target No. 28/5.01) 
REPORT NO, 124 based on the interrogation o~ ALBERT SPEER, held at 1 :30 - 16:00 hours, Monday, 11 JUne 1945 
SUDJECT: General Policy on Production and, on Research 
·and Development. 
Question No. 1. 
Answer: 
Question No. 2. 
Answer: 
Questl.on No. 3. 
Answer: 
SEC.RET 
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How was pa~~ent o~ Contractors to organization 
Todt made? 
In most cases both inside and outside GERMANY 
tenders were called ~or and "~irm price" quoted, 
Payment was made on a contract basis. 
Exeeptions to1 this scheme occurred mainly in 
connection with work on the eastern ~ront, 
where due to urgency and small nature· o~ the 
separate works the nearest available contractor 
was directed to the work. Payment' cost plus 
50% to 60% o~ labour costs to -
(a) remunerate the contractor · 
(b) cover overhead and depreciatton 
Materials were provided by O.T. 
This cost plus basis was more expedient but also 
more expensive than the normal contract basis. 
This system was not as 'remunerativ·e as it may 
appear because labour costs were lQW and the 
total cost o~ works in most cases small. 
German Contractors in foreign countries wore . 
o.T. uni~o~~ and held D.T. rank, but were paid 
privately by their ~irms. 
Has Dr. SPEER any knowledge of "Adrena"? 
No; but he knows i·t has been abandoned in ~avour 
of the'"Hollerith" process. SPEER thinks there 
may be some o~ tha Adrena machines in use in 
industry, but he did not know where. 
What is the Inpsection Organization in GERMANY? 
SPEER indicated (a.) That it was separately con-
trolled by each of the services. so independent 
were theae separate orcc.nizations that i~ one 
manufacturer was making equipment for more than 
one service the respective serv!.ces· were ali 
represented in the factory. 
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Question No. 4. 
Answer: 
Question No. 5. 
Answer: 
Question No. 6 
Answer: 
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(b) The Chief or the Army Inspection Organizatior 
was Col. JUSTROW who was responsible to the 
Herreswarrenamt (Army W&apon Office). He did 
not know who controlled Navy and'Air Force, but 
stated that SAUR and MILCH should be able to givE 
the appropriate information. 
(c) There was no orricial relaxation of standard~ 
during the war. However, SPEER found during 
visits to the rron that orricers expressed the 
views that the quality or equipment was deterior-
ating. 
(d) SPEER knew nothing or statistical quality 
cpntrol being employed but stated that SAUR mau 
know something about this. 
Did the SPEER Organization carry out any re-
conditioning or Service equipment? 
No; but SPEER was anxious to take over respon-
sibility in this direction. The reason for the 
failt~e of some such scheme was due to opposi-
tion by the Army. This was due primarily to 
the rixed policy of the High Command to issue 
90% of all new equipment to newly raised units 
and only 10% to troops at battle station. Army 
opinion as a whole was thus afraid that ir rront 
line units relwased their equipment rearwar4 or 
their own base workshops replacements would 
never be erfected. 
Research and Development; what is general policy 
SPEER was or the opinion that the two mainstays 
or German research were -
(a) High School and Universities; latterly co-
ordinated by Dr. Osenberg. 
{b) Industry: He clea1•ly distinguished between 
Research and Development. The latter is carried 
out also very largely by industry but also by 
service establishments. The Army had only one 
such establishment - Peeneou~de. The Navy had 
a technical "IC" section and Submarine and 
Torpedo Establishments. 
In view of the above stct&ment on the almost 
complete control or aevelopment or Army Equip-
ment by Industry, how was the interchange or 
information on derects and perrormance between 
the factory and ~he rield carried out? 
SPEER stated that there was practically no ex-
change of such· information and he considered 
this a very unsatisfactory state of affairs. 
H~ gave speciric instance or how, when he was 
visiting the rront, German units were suggest-
ing modifications to Radar Equipment to im-
prove its efrectiveness QGninst Dritish bombers. 
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The suggeat&d modifications were transmitted 
· re&PV&rd, through normal channels. to High 
CoJIIIIWld lerel, Sl.d thence d01m tJM ac~e again 
to SPEER. This. information f'1n&llJ' reached him 
2-3 months a.t'ter ·he had fira.t heard about it in 
the field.: 
In general,. no representative of the manufactui--
er waa permitted to go to the field. The Whole 
problem of operational research and introduction 
of·pr.oi:essive modifications wa~ in SPEER's 
words 'a tinkering business" · , 
SPEER agreed to prepare a. "recherche" on his 
views of Organi&ation of Research and Develop-
ment on a. na.tiona.l basis. 
Does standardization ~n production produce 
sterilization? 
It may in time, but in GERMANY, not for a. very 
long time. SPEER appeared to think tha.t Gel'lll8.n 
Production methods and design details were so 
varied tha.t much.could have. been done to improve 
p~duction and equipment by standardization. 
- 69 -
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APPENDIX "M" 
COMBINED"INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES.SUB-COMMITTEE 
*** 
INTERROGATION OF ALBERT SPEERi FORMER REICH MINISTER OF 
ARMAMEJITS AND WAR PRODUCTION 
(Target No. 28/5.01) 
Report No. 13 of 20 June 1945. 
SUBJECT: SPEER MINISTRY PERSONNEL. 
Delov is a. "Who's Who" of the SPEER Ministry and its affili-
ated agencies which has been translated from an original prepared 
by Albert SPEER himself during ·the first CIOS interrogations. It 
contains the names of personnel vhom SPEER regards as particular-
ly knowledge~ble on the ~arious subjects which were touched upon 
during the preliminary interrogation. Present whereabouts of the. 
individuals concerned, to the extent that .they were kno·,m to him, 
are shown in the.l~st. SPEER supplied brief characterist~cs of 
each individual. It vill be seen that these judgments, in most 
cases, refer to their performance while employed under SPEER, 
rather than to their value as sources or information. 
SPEER placed asterisks against the names of those individ-
uals who, in his view, would be of immediate ~alue for interroga-
tion. 
N.AME 
*~ 
* Oberst STOLL 
* KISTER 
* WAGENFUEHn 
* WENIGER 
.PLANUNGSAl.fr 
(Planning Department) 
POSITION 
OR FIELD 
LOCALITY COMMENTS 
(Head) Probably in.BERLIN, 
possibly Ludwigslust 
c/o R.V. KOHLE*) 
(Deputy) Not Known 
(Ministerialrat) " " 
(Chief of Statistics) " "· 
" 
II 
Diligent, 
but only 
third 
rate • 
Very good, 
fast worker. 
Methodical 
vorker, dif'-
cicult man. 
- - - - ~ - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - -
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(KEHRL) 
* !£Q!d! 
KRAUC!L 
BUETEFISCH 
DH. MIDROS 
viESTTIICK 
!;'I SCHER 
ROHSTOFFAMT 
(Raw Materials Department) 
POSITION 
OR FIELD 
(Head) 
(In Charge of 
ehemicals) 
LOCALITY 
c/o Degussa 
FRANKFUHT a/M 
In charge of plant Near Hermsdorf 
expansion in chem-
ical industry. 
Leuna ** 
LUDWIGSHAFEN 
(Aluminium) Not Known 
COMMENTS 
Good knowledge of 
chemico.l produc-
tion plo.nning. 
Very diligent and 
enorg0tic but genu 
ral approach often 
biased. 
Very good hydro-
genation expert. 
Very good young 
expert familia:r 
with all special 
materi'als (T.u.n. 
Stoffe, Kampstoffe 
N.Stoff and Buna) 
Good for planning 
and als9 other 
tasks 
(Alloys and al-
loy metals) Edelstahlwerke,Good 
KREFELD. 
(Oil Production SWITZERLAND 
and distribution) 
First Class expert 
a1so on Rumanian 
oil. ' 
ROSENKR<i.NTZ (Mineraloelstelle) Not known FISCHER's princi-
pal collaborator 
*'GABEL Oberbergha.uptmann, in 
charge of all mining 
II II Very good expert, 
diligent but often 
somewhat fanciful 
(Reichsver, ~ohle)'SALZGITTER Engergetic but 
fitful, of limited 
use in senior a~­
signments. 
ROSEWATIANTZ (Coal) 
SOGEMEYER (coal) 
SPHINGORUl-1 (Coal 
In his own 
hunting lodge 
Best man in R.V. 
Kahle for alloca-
tion ana. advance 
planning, lucid 
and reliable. 
Not Known (R.V. KOHLE). 
Close collaborator 
. of PLEIGER. Usefu 
but not as good e!3 
ROSENKRANTZ 
RuHRGEDIET Repres-entative of 
R.V. KOHLE i·n the 
RUHR. Very good 
and reliable. 
RUHRGEDIET Very good and o. 
MANNES~~ clear thinker. Wel 
suited for R.V. 
Kohle. ·· 
* KEI-JTIL Is wfiereo.bouts are not at LUDWIGSLUST. 
** .t.lree.CI.y interrogc.tod by CIOS. 
C ... ~ T 
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POSITION 
OR FIELD LOCALITY COMMENTS 
TECHNISCHES AM'!'. 
(Technicai Department) 
Head Last in Salz- Too ambitious and, 
burg *** not realist, but 
good in secondary 
or tertiary posi-
tions. very · 
diligent and extrri 
ordinery memory fb 
figures. 
* PIUESE Personal Assistant Last in Salz- Very.usef'ul f'or 
organisation. Goo 
knowledge of' all 
to SAUR burg 
ROHLAND (Steel) 
ROCHLING (Steel) 
KRAEMER (Steel) 
HOUDREI>IONT (metals) 
procedures. 
R'(fflR, c/o VERE- Very good worker, 
INGITE STAHL- fast and thorough, 
WERKE sound expert know-
ledge. Leading ma 
in .R. V. EISEN. 
Last in STUTT- Very active despit 
GABT, to be found his age. Ver'9'" 
througc KELCHNER interesting re-
search and develQ 
ment ideas on 
~teel improvement 
and processing. 
Not Known Very active in 
R.V. EISEN; in 
charge of' organi-
sational questions 
KRUPP, ESSEN In charge of all 
conversations of 
·alloy and NF met-
als. F~rst-Rate 
expert. Better en 
theoretical find-
ings than their 
practical execu~ 
tions. 
* Oberst SCHAEDE Head, Manu- SAALFELD in Technol~gical mat-
ters, rationnlisn~ 
tion, god ideas. 
facture Branch TH. 
Oberst GEIST Head, Development 
Branch Not known 
* 
*** Available f'or interrogation with Speer. 
·s-EC n E T - 72 ..,.. 
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Good and absorbin( 
other people's 
ideas. useful far 
. information and 
specific tasks. 
Good expert. Ve~ 
hard working, but 
too methodical. 
Especially f'amil:i.c 
With ammunition 
development. 
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NAME POSITION 
OR FIELD LOCALITY COMMENTS. 
(Steel) Vereinigte .Closest collaborator 
Stahlwerke, RUHRof' ROHLAND. very 
·versatile and use~ 
f'ul. 
*~ SAUR I s Dept\t y Ammunition 
m Weapons 
* WEISSENBORN TIX 1 s 
d':'puty 
STIELER VON Tanks, AFVs 
HEIDENKAMPF 
~ Motors 
' 
DR, HASPEL Aero-Engines 
LUESCHEN Electrical 
Engineering 
Tirschenreuth, 
HOF 
HANOMAG, 
HANNOVER 
With SAUR 
Not known 
Probably in 
BERLIN 
Daimler-Benz, 
STUTGART 
Probably in 
.DERLIN 
*~ (AEG) LEUSCHEN 1 s Not Known Deputy 
MERKER 
FRYDAG 
LANGENOHL 
MAUTERER 
Ship-building ULM, MAGIRUS-
WERn 
Airf'rames 
* 
Ca-stings, f'org- VEREINIGTE 
ings 1 etc. STAHLWERKE, 
RUHR 
Steel cons- DORTMtJm)ER 
truction UNION 
Machinery 
* Available f'or interrogation with SPEER 
SECRET 
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Very good, lucid . 
worke.r dependable 
and candid. 
Clenr thinker, good 
at over-all assess-
ments andlong-range 
planning 
Ruthless, very 
diligent good spe-
cial knowledge 
one of' the best 
young industrial 
le&ders. Energetic 
lucid and clean. 
'previously in char~ 
of' tank engines. 
Very energetic, good 
planner, very usef'ul, 
Good knowledge of' 
planning. Decent 
and loyal. 
First rate expert 
and upright decent 
character 
very keen,but too 
· · ambitious, gobd 
knowledge & long 
term dispositions. 
The best Main Com-
mittee Leader. 
Sound basic ideas 
coupled with ability 
to enf'orce their 
realisation. 
Very good, decent 
and diligent 
Very good worker, 
diligent and depend-
able. Good at · 
Jtlanning 
'Very versatile, ac-
complishes seemingly 
impossible tasks. 
An original; loyal 
and decent. 
Not a technician, but 
knows his way about. 
Has no constructive 
ideas. conf'used and 
unsystematic in plan~ 
ning, but quite use-
ful. 
Appendix "M" 
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NAME 
* SEEBAUER 
POSITION 
OR FIELD 
LOCALITY 
Vehicles Commis-W1th SAUR 
sioner 
General Supplies Not lOlo:m 
Shipbuilding CODl-
missioner Not Known 
PRODUKTIONSAli!T 
COMMENTS 
Versatile, but too 
ambitious 
Energetic, auite use-
f'ul 
Very good worker, 
tenacious and decent , 
Also usef'ul on iron 
eonstruction and 
iron allocation tor 
building. 
(Production Department) 
Head 
Deputy 
MUENCHEN, BAYER-Very quiet but f'irm 
ISCHE ELEKTRIZ ~and tenacious. An-
ITAETSWERKE alyses a situation 
clearly and carries 
out his decisions; 
useful f'or leading 
tasks. (Probably 
knows HUPFAUER' s 
whereabouts). 
Not Known Good expert on con-
sumers ' goods requ.ir e· 
:mente. 
CAll leaders of' Production Committees in 
Trade Groups are usetul!7 . 
GOEBEL MANNHEIM Was to be appointed 
SEEBAUER's Deputy. 
Good team worker. 
Ambitious. 
- - w - ·- - - - - - - - - - - - • - ~ • - - - - - • - - - - - - ~-
* HUPFAUER Chief' 
(Central Department) 
MUENCHEN or 
SONTHOFEN 
* IEBEL Former chief' NUERNBERG 
Unobjectionable 
character, loyal and 
without personal 
ambitions. Very 
intelligent and ob-
servant; steady. 
Run do.wn, but decent 
and loyal; f'iar, 
Essential source on 
~olitical background (STREICHER)**) 
* SPEER explained that in .a recent "purge" of' the 
Production Committees, all "inefficient leaders" 
were eliminated. 
** SPEER explained that LIEBEL obtained the resignation 
of STREICHER as Gauleiter of NUERNBERG. LIEBEL_was "Nhe 
only Mayor who ever managed to get rid of' a Gauleiter • 
SECRET 
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NAME 
WAEGER 
POSITION LOCALITY 
OR FIELD 
f'oi"l!ler chief' 
of' Rustungs!3JI!t 
COMMENT 
Army Corps commander 
in AI"l!ly Group 
SCHOERNER. VerY, 
honest and loyal; 
not a "typical of'f'i-
cer"; a bit slow. 
Essential source f'or 
'activities Ruestung-. 
samt up to 1945 (Labour supply-
SAUCKEL)*** 
* SCHMELTER Labour supply Internment camp Very versatile and 
near BLANEKEN- quick ~n the uptake. 
DURG Good expert knowledg 
* Oberst von SCHMELTER's ·sALZBURq 
NIKOLAI predecessor 
* FRAENK 
* MOMMSEN 
* HETTL(IGE 
VOEGLER 
MALZACHER 
Organisation 
Personnel 
BLANKENBuRG 
****) 
BLANXENBURG 
HAMBURG****) 
HAMBURG 
1 Commerzba.nk 
ZEN'.CM!.AMT 
(Regional Level) 
VEREINIGTE 
STAHLWERKE, 
RUHRGEBIET 
Not Known, 
HOLLAND . 
Probably SALZ-
BURG via NIKO-· 
LAI 
·' 
Very diligent, but 
pedantic; honest and 
loyal. 
Specialized know~. 
ledge, decent but 
not too· diligent, 
usef'ul. 
Very versatile, good 
organiser, suitable 
f'or reconstruction 
of ministerial re-
cords. 
Very good knowledge 
of' personnel. Inclir 
ed to over-hasty judgements. 
Clear and logi·cal 
thinker, very use-
f'ul f'or leading · 
psotions 
Good expert on the 
RUHR in general. 
Good at long-range 
planning. Scientiflc 
interests. Presi-
dent of' Kaisev Wil-
helm Gesellschaf't. 
"No personai ambiticn: 
Very energetic, in-
.dependent suitable 
f'or secondary tasks, 
Upper and Lower 
SILESIA, Proteoto-
rate,Au8tria. Built 
up UPPER SILESIA. 
Good knowledge, one 
of' the best young 
industrial leaders. 
Ambitious but decent 
*** wAEGER is f'amiliar .with the diff'erences between 
SAUCKEL and the SPEER Ministry on labour supply 
questions. · " 
**** Available for interrogation with SPEER. 
SECRET 
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SCHNEIDER 
LEITimR 
. . KLECHNER 
BECKHURTS 
* HOFF!MN 
MEINDL 
HOFWEBER 
POSITION 
OR FIELD 
LOCALITY 
{Deutsche Warren u. 
Munition, POSEN): 
now probably in 
Central Gel"lllB.lly 
BOEHLERSTAHL, KAP-
FENBERG, AUS'l'RIA 
LGndeswirtschaft-
so.m~ ~ZBURG 
Last near STUTT-
GART 
WEIMAR, GUSTLOFF~ 
WERKE 
HAMBURG,.NORDDEUT-
SCHER LLOYD 
Not known 
sTEnt, s~­
WERKE 
MANNHEIM 
AMT . ENBRGIE 
(Power Department) 
* SCHULZE-F~LITZ. HEAD BUTIN AREA 
COMMENTS I 
Energetic, very 
hard worker. 
One or the best 
Austrian young in-
dustrialists, »n-
prejudiced, fas't am 
consci~ntious work~ 
suitable for lending 
positions. · 
Good chief of a 
Landeswirtschaftsamt 
surprlsingly fresh 
and energetic for a 
Civil, Servant • 
Armaments Commission 
for the South West. 
Good technical worke1 
Too impulsive, but 
very good in secon-
dary roles. · 
. I 
Chairman of Armamentt 
Commission for 
THURINGIA. Good 
team wo~ker. ·Tena-
cious and·reliable, 
a bit nervous in his. 
work. 
Armaments Commission• 
er for the'Nortp 
West. Good fast 
worker. Good know-
ledge or food and 
other economic prob-
lems, lucid planner. 
Transport organisa-
'tion good ideas, 
somewhat heavy but 
s.olid worker. 
Chairman of Armament 
Commission for · 
AUSTRIA. Very abb 
and quick to decide. 
Inclined to be an 
opportunist. 
Armaments Foreman 
for DADEN. Very goo a 
and solid team 
worker.. Responsible, 
decent and loynl. 
Construction enginee~­
but good erpert on 
power. Slow but 
thorough worker. 
Very·reliable, but 
stubborn in a ravoz-.; 
able sense. 
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NAME POSITION LOCALITY 
OR FIELD 
DR. CARL Powe~ Planning Not Known 
STEIRINGER Regional Power .INSBRUCK 
dist~ibutor 
* FISCHER 
COMMENTS 
Fresh and quick on 
the uptake, bUt some· 
what irresponsible 
in his judgments. 
Good team worker. 
Solid and keen. 
Good team worker. 
REICH P-over 
diStributor P~obably nea~ Excellent, the best 
DESSAU man in power Dept. 
Fast and selr-assur-
ed worker, .dependabl 
in his judgment. · 
Lacks last ounce or 
energy. 
AMT rum (AUCH Fm:R GEJ~j"JmALINSP, FtiER DAS STRASSENWESEN) 
Building Department incl. Inspector- General or Roads. 
DORSCH Head 
*·~ Deputy 
Not Known 
Near KLAGEN-
FURT 
SCHOENLEBEN Not, known 
ANBERLEN (?) Roads expert Not known 
(Einsatzgruppe Probably OSLO 
NORWAY) 
(Einsatzgruppe RA1·1BURG 
Nordwest) 
Reprehensible char-
acter, ruthless. 
Best young building 
expert. Clear and 
determined good at 
making decisions and 
settling dirrerences 
sound judgment on 
·conditions, decides 
quickly and consist-
ently. Suitable r~ 
ma.jor tasks. 
Recently with G.B. 
C.hemie, previously 
Reichsautobahnen •. 
Good team worker but 
not in leading posi-
tions. Too diligent 
and pedantic,-no 
gbneral view but v~ 
reliable.in seconder 
or tertiary roles. 
Good team worker. 
Not versatile enough 
but diligent and · 
reliable. 
Best building expert 
next to FUCHS. Ver,r 
energetic and too : 
ruthless. Tough ar.d 
determined good org~ 
aniser. 
very diligent and 
reliable. Makes up 
by improvisation and 
ability ror lack o£ 
planning. An 
original. 
SECRET 
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NAME. POSITION 
OR FmLD 
LOCALITY 
(Einaatzgruppe RUHRBEBIET 
RJDj:IN-RUlm) 
* STOBBE Former Head DUSSELDORF 
o.r· DORTMUND DETHLEFSEN 
Ministerbuero 
(Ministerial Secretariat) 
* DR. GOERNER SPEER's HAMBURG c/o . Personal Assistant Commerzbank 
. * FRAU K:E:MPF secretary 
* FRL. MAGEB!tA secretary 
Good planner and 
oi"ganiser on a 
limited scale. "de-
termined and tenac-
ious. Good boss,, 
unprejudiced, thinks 
too .much of himself. 
Building contractor, 
head of a big firm. 
Very reliable and 
agreeable collabora-
tor. Candid and 
upright. Sui table 
for a leading posi-
tion. 
Conscientious and 
not to be influenced 
good worker, s.elf-
effacing • 
Private secretary 
for 10 years. Ex-
cellent knowledge of 
procedures and re-
cords of Ministry. 
Very hard ~orking. 
For several years 
with' TODT and famil-
iar with his activir 
ties. Very diligent 
20 JUne 1945 MR • HOEFFDING, 
Leader of CIOS Team. 
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9Q!9I!JP INTEif.IGENCE OBJECTIVES SUB-COMMITTEE 
· REPORT NO. 14 1 held ~t 15o0 to 1630 hours on Yednesday, 13 June 
1945. . 
SUBJECTS: A. 
B. 
c. 
Supnly or Armaments to forces in the field. 
Pro~ction planning. 
Proportion between air frames and aero 
erig1nes. 
SUPPLY OF ARMAMENTS TO FORCES IN THE FIELD 
lt was pointed out to SPEER that w~have been puzzled by 
the apparent inability of the 1German high command to utilize the large amount of armaments·produced in a more efficient 
manner •. SPEER said that the basic mi-stake, as far as ground 
forces were concerned, was one of policy. This polio~ called 
for 90% of armament production to go to new, green divisions 
as against 10% for re-equipping units on the line. Thus the 
wastage rate of equipment was unnecessarily high because it 
was continuously given·to inexperienced troops who. in their 
fi-rst engagement, lost more than an experienced unit would 
have under equal conditions of comoat. SPEER illustrated this 
by describing an instance that he had witnessed in the Sieg-
fried Line.near ECHTERNACH. An old armored division had been 
in_ the line for a long time but had been able to hold many of 
our attacks. Their manpower and equipment had been "bled· 
white" until they had o.nly .ten tanks left, but they were still 
ablo to hold. At th&t point, a new Panzer Division with all 
new equipment was thrown into the sector. A counter-attack 
was.staged, With 35 Panther~ as the backbone. Of those 35 . 
Panthers unloaded, only 25 reached the line of departure. 10 
broke down en route through inexperienced handling by the green 
drivers. The remaining 25 Panthers drove a head-on charge 
against a battery of American AT-~ns, which cost them 15 more 
tanks lost. The remaining 10 withdrew in a disorderly manner. 
SPEER stated that this instance was typical. 
In the ammuriition field the mistake was somewhat dif·fer-
ent. Here the policy was to estab·lish forward dumps approxim-
ately 50 to 100 kilometers be~d the front ·line 1 especially 
in RUSSIA. Consequently, a Russian attack when it broke, 
would find German troops in the line without .sufficient 
ammunition to meet it, let alone to mount a counter-attack. 
This in turn would enable the Russians to penetrate to ·such 
depth as to capture the ammunition dumps themselves. Generally 
the consideration of shipping space was neglected. Thus spare 
parts for·tanks were never there in sufficient numbers and many 
tanks had to be abandoned for lack of maybe one spare part. 
SPEER would have liked to ship·m&ny more tank motors instead 
of complete new tanks. Ten motors require the same· space as 
does one tank. But not until very late was this mistake 
recognized by the command. 
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In the' air, especially on the Western front in the" initial 
stages, the mistake was in the dissipation of available powe~ 
(as previously established). A total of 2000 fighters was . 
released out of GALLAND's reserve for use against the Allied 
invasion forces, although this reserve had been built up for use 
against our bomber formations over the REICli proPer. The trans-
fer of tha~e fighters to the front took place 10 smal1 batches. 
The fields available behind the front were limited in number, 
and were soon located so far inland that most of the fuel was 
burned up by the fighters to move to arid from the target areS", 
thereby reducing the f1gb.ter 's c.ombat time to apprOJtim&tely 5 
minutes. Moreover. so many ftghters had to be jammed into the 
limited number of fields, that the inevitable destruction of 
large n~be~s of ai~cratt on the ground by our own planes 
followed. Thus no instance is known to SPEER where the German 
air force was able to ass~ble in sufficient strength at any 
one place (Schwerpunkt) to be favoUl'able-to German ground troops, 
let alone decisive. SPEER and GALLAND were strongly advocating 
the complete withdrawal of the Luftwaffe from the_Western front 
in- favour of an: all-out air effort over GERMANY'. It was planned, 
when our long-range fighter escorts began to be of decisive 
weight, to allow our formations to penett>ate as deep, as a line 
running north-south through GERMANY on the longitude of the 
HARZ mountains. This line, it was estimat~d, would correspond 
with the distance from where on the east the Allied fighter 
escort started worrying about their fuel reserve. It would, 
at the same time, enable German fighters to come to grips with 
the enemy at a favourably short distance .from their home 
fields. However, the necessary large number of fighters to 
carry out this plan was taken away for the above-mentioned 
purpose. 
SPEER 1l.lu13trated the strategic conditions for air as 
follows: Allied aluminium production was four times 'that of 
GERMANY. In order to keep parity it was necessary to slioo.t 
dhown four Allied fighters for ever1·Ge~ fighter lost. This 
was at no time achieved. On the contrary, the proportion came 
closer to being reversed, showing in SPEER's opinion the 
absurdity of employing German fighters against Allied fighters. 
The proportion became much mo1•e' favourable if German fighters 
were employed against Alli.ed bombers. Here SPEER claim!J the 
following figures: 100 Germanfighters were able to shoot· 
down 25 Allied bombers, at a loss of 25 German fighters and 50% or 125 men·crew loss. One German fighter thus was the cost 
for eliminating one Allied bomber •. One bomber used nine times 
as much aluminium as one fighter. The parity requirements were 
four Allied fighters lost against one German fighter. ·In terms 
of aluminium, therefore, the loss of one Allied bomber for 
the price of one German fdghter, gave the Germans an edge of 2.5 
fighters in their favour. If SPEER and GALLAND would have been 
able to employ German fighter strength.in the above-mentioned 
manner at a time and location unfavourable to Allied long-range 
gither escorts, we would have been eventually forced to cut . · 
down on our bombing ~ssions and/or -to draw on the Allied air 
umbrella over the Western front - thereby changing the odds in 
favour of German.ground forces.· · 
PRdDUCTION PLANlfiNG 
•It was pointed out to SPEER that, contrary to his earlier 
statements, there was no long range planning in German·war pro-
duction, we had got hold of ·some Planungsamt index curves which 
clearly showed long range production planning· up to 1946 in 
some ins t.ances. SPEER replied as follows: The long r~e 
planning was cm-ried out by KEHRL' s l'lanungsamt on the basd.s 
of production capacity. The figures for this so-called 
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Industrieprogram were furnished by the Main Committees 
(Hauptausschuessen) in each field, with production facilities, 
i.e. plant space, available machinery and partly labour a s the 
only consideration. The Planungsamt consolidated these data 
into the long-range production plan, admittedly without much 
consideration of the raw materials available, also without con-
sidering expected production. loss through .air attack. This 
Ihdustrieprogramm was not given to the producers, but had more 
or less the function o~n overall barometer. The only planning 
that was given to proeucers, was based (as we know) on the raw 
material allocation every three months. For instance: on the 
lst January 1944, 20,000 trucks with 3 tons steel each were to 
go into production. The pertinent main committee asked for a 
steel allocation of 60,000 tons. SPEER cut that request by 
10,000 tons,- thereby insuring himself against raw material 
hoar.ding by the industries as well as againstthe possible piling 
up of unprocessed raw materials due to the loss of production 
facilities through air raids •. On the lst June 1944, (six 
months production time necessary for the programme of lst Janu-
ary 1944), it became apparent that o~ly 10,000 trucks had been 
delivered out of the January allocation, thus leaving 20,000 
out of the original 50,000 tons of raw material unprocessed. 
'cons'equently, the allocation fo~ the quarter beginning on lst 
June 1944 was •Only 30,000 ton;>, or half of the requested amount 
of 60,000. SPEER there again made the intial cut of 10,000 
tons, plus the 20,000 tons left over from the previous period. 
Asked for the reasons why ·it was possible in the machine tool 
industry to hoard large amounts of raw materials up to the end 
of the war despite his policy, SPEER said that the machine tool 
industry was always dominated by policies of in:vestmentrather 
than rationalization and that LANGE even in his function as head 
of the Hauptausschuss had bery much the interest of his industry 
at heart. SPEER also admitted tolerance of the machine t"ol 
situation in order to preserve elasticity in the face of Allied 
air attack, as well as for reasons of the complexity of types of 
air engines requested by tha Luftwaffe. 
PROPORTION BETWEEN AIR FRAMES AriD AIR ENGINES 
Reminded of an earlier statement "to the effect that our 
bmbing of air frames brought about a better balnnc.e between frame 
and engine production, SPEER stated that his remarks had been 
essentially correct. Asked why such a large discrepancy between 
high frame and low engine production was allowed to develop 
during a time which was still free of precision air attacks, 
SPEER said that the reason was sole¥ in the f~equent design · 
changes requested by the Luftwaffe. A plant like the ostmark 
Werke in VIENNA was scheduled for a monthly production of 1,000 
engines, but never got above 200 or 300. Engines changed 
(admitti;ldly through tactical necessity) every two or three months 
while the production o~ frames could continue undistur0ed. 
SPEER referred to the ME-109 as a typical example, where the 
l;lame frame was equipped first with the JUMO, then the BMW and 
finally the DAIMLER-BENZ (I am not sure about the sequence) 
SPEER emphasized that the raw material and labour planning, as 
well as the machine tool planning would have boen co~p~etely 
sound, had it been possible to stick to the· same type over a 
longer period, 
13 June 1945 l~t Lt. SKLARZ, USSBS. 
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APPENDIX "P" 
COMBINED INTJi:LLIGENCE OBJECTIVES SUB-COMMITTEE 
EXAMINATION OF ALBERT SPEER AND MEMBERS 
OF THE FORMER REICH MINISTRY OF ARMAMENTS AND WAR PRODUCTION 
(Target No. 2!3/5.01 
REPORT NO. 16, based on the examination of SAUR, 
Chief of Technisches Amt, held at 1600 hours 23 June, 1945. 
SUBJECT: Information on Archives or· the Technisches Amt 
1. The Technisches Amt .as such did not possess a central 
Archive nor a Geheime Registratur. The distinguishing feature 
of the department was the complete absence of permanent officials 
(Benmter). (A). Registries were therefore kept at the working 
level,. viz: 
a. Amtsgruppe - Fortigung; Entwicklung; Vorschlage, 
No vital records were kept by the Amts-
gruppen Beauftragte, Motorisierung etc. 
b. Hauptausschusse and Ringe - Records with the Leiter in 
each case. The Beauftragto ret~ined very 
little with the ~xception of material on 
Schwerpunktbildung and Konzentration. 
c. Entwi.cklungkonunissione - Records with the vorsi t zer in 
each case. The material in the Amtsgruppe 
is very superficial. 
2. The only files of th~ Department proper are the stenographi< 
rccorus of the daily meeting where all decisions were taken. This 
started in March 1944 as the Jagerstab meeting; later, it became 
the Rustungsstab, and went on to the end. The decisions of the 
meeting were issued in the form of a circular of the Rustungsstdb 
which went to all the Wehrkreisbeauftragter, the Amtsgruppe and 
where relevant to the Ausschusse and Entwicklungskommissione. 
The location of the Stenographic record (Stenographisache Rustung: 
stabe Frntokole) is probably know to Ministerrat CLIEVER (locatio! 
unknown), and to the two secretaries who are being transferred 
to.DUSTBIN at- this moment. 
3. Dispersal of the Department and the Mystery of the Train 
At the beginning of March 1945, the ministry was dispersed 
in eleven towns and villages centred round PLAZENBURG bei ~­
BACH where SAUR had a special train which acted as his HQ • 
. (Code name HUBERT~SZUG). 
Three further evacuations took place working to the S.E. 
(north of SALZBURG, south of SALZBURG). Each time the evacuated 
sections became oore and more attenuated; both staff and document: 
were left en route. Finally the train - reduced to three car-
rinses- was taken to PULLACH (9 kil. South of MUNICH) where it joined the trains of KESSELRING; O.K.W. Sud - General WINTER; 
Transportchef KOERNER; and others to f'orm the Southern HQ where 11 
remained. • 
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SAUR in~tisted that at no time did the train contain docu-
ments other than Handaktiven. 
4. SAUR vas requeste4 to furnish a schemat of the Technisches 
Amt shoving the centres of document hllding and their last 
kno~ lcocations. This has been ·done, and the report will be 
circulated shortly. 
5.. Personnel 
Oberst SCHADE - vas at SAD ILSTER (~. czech frontier .North 
of ASCB) on 11 ,April• Manage%' of Schade 
W&aohmachinen at SAALFELD who may have neWB. 
J.~so try Major FRENZEL at Chocolate Factory 
Mauxion at SAALFELD. 
Note (A) - Thus all planning and. stats was done by the 
Planungsamt; raw material computations at the Rohstoffsamt: 
Kont1gentierung by the various allocating bodies. The 
Department's main work was done in Industry. 
Generalkonaul STAHL - T%'7 Thiel at RUHLA or MULHAUSEN. 
Oberst GEIST - unknown but his deputy 
Oberst GUAL - was at PULLACH on May 28; was c~gnisant of 
the working of the development commissions. 
23 .rune 1945 Mr. J. SEL~, CIOS (F.O.) 
fl 
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